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INTELLIGENCE STUDIES: SOME THOUGHTS 
ON THE STATE OF THE ART1 
 
PETER GILL, MARK PHYTHIAN 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The paper is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the field of Intelligence Studies 
but summarises the major currents in research in this area, in the last twenty years. In addition, it 
suggests directions for future research concluding that Intelligence Studies represents a healthy 
and growing activity of great relevance to contemporary security governance. There are identified 
a few challenges for the development of the domain, mainly the fact that Anglo-American authors 
and subject matter continue to dominate the literature, and the fact that the relations between the 
academic institutions and intelligence agencies, the civil-military relations, have not always been easy. 
Keywords: Intelligence studies, intelligence services, academia, security governance, 
academic intelligence  
 
 
It is twenty years since Wesley Wark reflected on the state of Intelligence 
Studies (IS) in his introduction to a special issue of Intelligence and National 
Security that was based on papers delivered at a conference in Toronto in 1991. 
Wark identified eight approaches to the study of intelligence: the research 
project; the historical project; the definitional project; the methodological 
project (applying social science concepts to intelligence); memoirs; the civil 
liberties project; investigative journalism; and the popular culture project. 2 
Since then, we have seen steadily, at times rapidly, growing interest in and 
discussion of intelligence matters that has been driven not only by the pressure 
of events but also by greater academic research and increased teaching of 
relevant subjects. As we shall see, the term ‘Intelligence Studies’ is used 
advisedly since all those who have commented on its development agree that 
the field is multi- if not inter-disciplinary. This may reflect the relative youth of 
the field – until 1990 people outside the US will only have talked of 
‘intelligence history’ – but it is also a strength. Many academic disciplines now 
                                                          
1
  This article is adapted from the ‘Introduction’ to the second edition of our Intelligence in 
an Insecure World (Cambridge: Polity, 2012). 
2
  Wesley K. Wark, ‘Introduction: the Study of Espionage: Past Present, Future?’ Intelligence 
and National Security 8, 3 (1993), pp. 1-13. 
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contribute to IS by bringing their disciplinary concepts and methods to the party 
and this is important in demystifying the study of intelligence. In its early days 
writing was dominated by ex-practitioners and the impression given was that 
intelligence was a unique human activity. But intelligence is, at heart, an organisational 
activity and, with its special features such as secrecy, can be studied as such. 
This survey is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the field but 
summarises what seem to us to be the major currents in research and, in so 
doing, suggests directions for future research. The recent growth is reflected in a 
number of interesting articles examining the state of IS in various 
countries/languages. Drawing on Wark, Scott,3 Kahn,4 Rudner,5 Denécé and 
Arboit,6 and Matey,7 we identify four main areas of work: research/historical; 
definitional/methodological; organisational/functional; and governance/policy. 
The research/historical project continues to be dominant, at least outside the 
US, where the IS community has always been larger and more diverse. In the 
UK what has sometimes been described as the ‘British school’ of IS reflects not 
just the strength of the British community of historians but also that the two 
twentieth century world wars provided much of the original raw material; the 
strength of official secrecy ensured little on peacetime intelligence emerged 
before the 1990s and made the study of contemporary intelligence 
developments almost impossible. Academic writings based in part on released 
archives8 were supplemented by ‘insider’ accounts and memoirs of former 
practitioners,9 official histories,10 ‘usually reliable sources’ in which intelligence 
officers found willing journalists and writers such as Chapman Pincher and 
‘Nigel West’ to make their views public,11 and more critical accounts from 
writers such as Stephen Dorril.12 Since the ‘open government’ initiative 
                                                          
3
  Len Scott, ‘Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence: a British view’, Intelligence 
and National Security 22, 2 (2007), pp. 185-205. 
4
  David Kahn, ‘Intelligence Studies on the Continent,’ Intelligence and National Security 
23, 2 (2008), pp. 249-75. 
5
  Martin Rudner, ‘Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal 
Demand,’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, 1 (2009), pp. 110-30. 
6
  Eric Denécé, Gérald Arboit, ‘Intelligence Studies in France,’ International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, 4 (2010), pp. 725-47. 
7
  Gustavo Díaz Matey, ‘The Development of Intelligence Studies in Spain,’ International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, 4 (2010), pp. 748-65. 
8
  For example, Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence 
Community, London, Heinemann, 1985. 
9
  For example, Percy Sillitoe, Cloak without Dagger, London, Pan Books, 1956.  
10
  Five volumes of an official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War, 
authored mainly by F. H. Hinsley, were published: volumes 1-3 concerned the influence of intelligence 
on strategy and operations; vol. 4, security and counterintelligence; vol. 5 strategic deception. 
11
  For example, Chapman Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 
1981; Nigel West, A Matter of Trust: MI5 1945-72, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982. 
12
  Stephen Dorril, The Silent Conspiracy: Inside the Intelligence Services in the 1990s, 
London, Heinemann, 1993. 
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launched by Prime Minister John Major’s administration in the early 1990s 
started to bear fruit, releases of files from the National Archives have 
accelerated, at least from MI5 and GCHQ, if not MI6.13 There has been much 
more academic work, for example, by former intelligence official Michael 
Herman,14 Richard Aldrich on UK/US co-operation in the Cold War15 and 
GCHQ,16 Phil Davies on MI617 and whistleblower contributions.18 To celebrate 
their one hundredth anniversaries in 2009, both MI5 and MI6 commissioned 
official histories,19 with all the potential and limitations that official sanction 
implies.20 In some cases unofficial histories based on ‘liberated’ archives have 
been written, for example, the collaboration between Christopher Andrew and 
Vasili Mitrokhin on KGB material.21 A further trove of information appears in 
the evidence to and reports of inquiries into intelligence failures on Iraq, 
especially Butler, Hutton and Chilcot,22 and the second Intelligence and 
Security Committee report into the July 7 2005 bombings in London.23. 
                                                          
13
  Stephen Twigge, Graham Macklin, British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources, 
London, The National Archives, 2008. 
14
  Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War; Intelligence Services in the 
Information Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
15
  Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, 
London, John Murray, 2001. 
16
  Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence 
Agency, London, HarperPress, 2010. 
17
  Philip H. J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying. London, Frank Cass, 2004. 
18
  For example, Annie Machon, 2005, “Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers”, Lewes, The Book 
Guild, 2005; Richard Tomlinson, The Big Breach: from Top Secret to Maximum Security, 
Edinburgh, Cutting Edge, 2001. 
19
  Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, London, 
Allen Lane, 2009; Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 
London, Bloomsbury, 2010. 
20
  As John le Carré wrote: “When a secret service professes a new openness, we do well to 
count our silver. When it appoints its own trusted writer and feeds him selected top-secret 
documents that would land the less favoured in gaol, we have every right to be sceptical, as the 
recent “official histories” of MI5 and MI6 demonstrate all too clearly.” John le Carré, ‘Agent 
Zigzag’, The Times, March 5, 2011. 
21
  Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and 
the West, London, Allen Lane/Penguin, 1999; The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World, 
London, Allen Lane/Penguin, 2005. 
22
  Lord Butler, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, HC898, London, 
TSO, 2004, http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf; 
Lord Hutton, Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr. David Kelly, 
2004, http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/ accessed January 31, 2012; The Chilcott Inquiry is 
due to report in 2012. 
23
  Intelligence and Security Committee, Could 7/7 Have been Prevented? Cm 7617, London, 
TSO, 2009; http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/hearing_transcripts/index.htm, accessed 10 
August 2011. 
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Until 20 years ago there were only memoirs and journalistic writings on 
French intelligence.24 Until the 1990s even academic writing tended to be by 
foreigners, though since the mid-1990s academic output of history and other 
research subjects has increased.25 David Kahn talks of a re-birth of French 
intelligence literature in the past decade, mainly regarding the Cold War and 
facilitated by new archive releases26 but Eric Denécé and Gérald Arboit observe 
that IS is only in its infancy in France. Intelligence in France has been 
mistrusted since the Dreyfus affair, and academics have approached it in a 
fragmentary fashion. They note the lack of a French intelligence culture and 
that, very differently from the UK; it is seen primarily as a domestic 
phenomenon – the problem of the ‘enemy within’. 27  
The German intelligence literature is less extensive than the Francophone 
and is also primarily historical. 28 The International Intelligence History group 
meets mainly in Germany and has published the Journal of Intelligence History 
since 2001.29 Kahn notes the creation after re-unification of the office for the 
administration of the Stasi archives, known as Gauck-Behörde, with many 
volumes published and which provides access to personal files for 
victims/families.30 Gustavo Matey’s discussion of IS in Spain is more normative 
in tone but notes a similar increase in interest since the end of the Cold War. 
Earlier intelligence studies were dominated by history and military studies, 
reinforced by books on intelligence scandals in the 1980s and 1990s. Matey 
suggests there are four main broad approaches to IS in Spain: the historical-
military approach, the journalistic approach, the economic, and the international 
relations/political science (including philosophy and law).31  
Of course, the largest community of intelligence scholars is in the US but, 
whereas in most countries historical research dominates, in the US it has been 
complemented by other concerns. Although the study of intelligence 
everywhere is hindered by the ubiquity of secrecy, as Jim Wirtz notes, 
compared to elsewhere, Americans are remarkably open about discussing 
intelligence processes.32 He suggests this ‘culture of openness’ derives from a 
number of factors: the tradition of official post mortems into intelligence 
failures – there have been ten official inquiries into Pearl Harbour; 
                                                          
24
  For example, Richard Deacon, The French Secret Service, London, Grafton, 1990.  
25
  For example, Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the 
Gulf War, London: Macmillan, 1995. 
26
  Kahn, ‘Intelligence Studies on the Continent’, cit., pp. 249-62. 
27
  Denécé & Arboit, ‘Intelligence Studies in France.’  
28
  Kahn, ‘Intelligence Studies on the Continent’, cit., pp. 262-71. 
29
  www.intelligence-history.org/  
30
  http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Home/home_node.html accessed September 18, 2011. 
31
  Matey, ‘The Development of Intelligence Studies in Spain’, cit. 
32
  James J. Wirtz, ‘The American approach to Intelligence Studies’, in Loch Johnson (ed.), 
Handbook of Intelligence Studies, Abingdon, Routledge, 2007, pp. 28-38. 
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investigations into intelligence ‘scandals’, such as those during 1975-76 into 
CIA and FBI operations and in the 1980s into the Iran-Contra affair; official use 
of classified information to justify policy – most recently and infamously, Colin 
Powell’s highly misleading presentation on Iraq to the UN Security Council in 
February 2003; serial commissions and inquiries into how to ‘fix’ the US 
intelligence community; and leaks, of which the recent Wikileaks case was on 
an especially massive scale.  
Martin Rudner notes that out of 1800 research chairs in Canadian 
universities, there is not one in IS.33 Nevertheless, in many respects the scholarly 
and research community in Canada is better developed than in any other country 
outside the U.S. This can be seen in the very active Canadian Association for 
Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) whose annual conference exceeds in 
size and interest anything that could be currently organized in Europe. There have 
been similar motivations for historical research as in US, including investigation of 
scandals – McDonald34 and O’Connor35 – edited work on historical archives 
such as those on RCMP Security Bulletins by Greg Kealey and Reg Whitaker36 
and Wesley Wark’s official history of the community – long completed but as 
yet unpublished because of opposition from one of the agencies. 
∴ Reflecting the youth of the field, the definitional/methodological 
project is very alive and definitional debates are still taking place.37 While 
overly pedantic to some, these matter to the extent that they seek to clarify what 
is to be studied and why. For example, one key question is whether 
‘intelligence’ should be defined purely as an information or knowledge process 
or whether it is also a power process involving policy and action. We take the 
latter view because the very act of gathering information can affect others and, 
if the intended object of intelligence is not to influence action or policy, what is 
it for? Therefore we have defined intelligence as: 
 
                                                          
33
  Rudner, ’Intelligence Studies in Higher Education’, cit., p. 133. 
34
  Justice McDonald conducted the Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  
35
  Justice O’Connor conducted the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 
Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, http://publications.gc.ca.  
36
  A multi-volume series published in the 1990s by the Canadian Committee on Labour History.  
37
  Main examples include Michael Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence,’ Studies 
in Intelligence, 46, 3 (2002), http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/vol46no3/article02.html, accessed 
December 5, 2011; Kristan Wheaton, Michael Beerbower, ‘Towards a New Definition of 
Intelligence’, Stanford Law and Policy Review 17, 2 (2006) pp. 319-30; Peter Gill, ‘Theories of 
Intelligence: Where Are We, Where Should We Go and How Might We Proceed’, in Peter Gill, 
Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian (eds.), Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, London, 
Routledge, 2009, pp. 208-26. 
PETER GILL, MARK PHYTHIAN 10 
‘the mainly secret activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and 
action – intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by 
forewarning of threats and opportunities.’38 
 
We should remember Wilhelm Agrell’s observation that ‘if everything is 
intelligence, then nothing is intelligence’;39 in other words, is ‘intelligence’ any 
different from the ‘knowledge management’ that is the bedrock of all state and 
corporate activities? If the answer is ‘yes’ then we must be able to specify what 
is different about intelligence. We suggest that the key factors are security, 
secrecy and the fact that its exercise will be subject to resistance. We also need 
to consider the difference between intelligence and the more general ‘risk-
assessment’ process that accompanies everything from business takeovers and 
foreign investment to organising school trips for children.40  
For more than fifty years the intelligence ‘cycle’ has been almost 
universally-applied as a model for understanding intelligence and teaching 
under- and postgraduates as well as practitioners. With some slight variations 
this has been seen as proceeding from planning and direction to collection, 
processing, analysis and dissemination. But while the significance of these as 
elements in a ‘process’ is not really contested; there is increasing criticism of 
the idea that they constitute a sequential ‘cycle’. Indeed, it can be argued that in 
the light of technological and other developments, this model is so misleading 
that it should be abandoned.41  
More than 20 years ago some researchers were already seeking to apply 
concepts from elsewhere in the social sciences to understanding intelligence, to 
explain its successes and failures and to examine intelligence organisations and 
processes, especially with the normative aim of improving them.42 Much 
consideration has been given to the issue of ‘failure’, starting with Betts’ classic 
article43 which arguably provides a theoretical handle on our subject equivalent 
to the ‘causes’ of war in International Relations.44 More researchers have 
                                                          
38
  Peter Gill & Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 2nd edn., Cambridge: 
Polity, 2012, p. 30. 
39
  Wilhelm Agrell, When Everything Is Intelligence – Nothing Is Intelligence, Occasional 
Papers, 1, 4, (2002), Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/pdf/OPNo4.pdf, accessed December 
12, 2011. 
40
  With colleagues we have discussed this question in a number of articles appearing in 
Intelligence and National Security, 27, 2 (2012). 
41
  This was the subject of a Panel at the International Studies Association conference, San 
Diego, April 2012. See also Gill & Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 2nd edn.Ch.1. 
42
  Wirtz, The American approach, pp.31-34. 
43
  Richard K. Betts, ‘Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,’ 
World Politics, 31, 1 (1978), pp. 61-89 (re-printed in Gill, Marrin & Phythian (eds.), Intelligence 
Theory, pp. 87-111). 
44
  Mark Phythian, ‘Intelligence Theory and Theories of International Relations: Shared 
World or Separate Worlds?’ in Gill et al (eds.), Intelligence Theory, pp. 54-72. 
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applied other social science concepts, for example, Michael Herman45, Phil 
Davies46 and Amy Zegart47 deploying ideas of organisational process; Gill using 
‘information control’48 and our use of ‘surveillance’ as an underlying concept 
for the study of intelligence.49 The main point is that intelligence is a pre-
eminently social and political phenomenon and, therefore, there is no need for 
IS to re-invent the wheel.  
Most of the historical work discussed above was essentially descriptive but it 
provides the essential basis for the third project: the organisational/functional. 
Looking at the potential population of intelligence agencies that might have 
been written about, it is striking that some have received much more coverage 
than others. Probably reflecting the historical interest in international politics 
and war, foreign intelligence agencies are best covered, especially those 
gathering human intelligence and also involved in covert operations. More ink 
has probably been spilt on the CIA than any other agency in the world.50 Why is 
this? The analytical directorate of the CIA provided a home for many 
intellectuals who, on retirement, took the opportunity to reflect on and 
contribute to the debates about the study of intelligence and intelligence reform. 
The operational side of the CIA, on the other hand, provided much of the 
material for discussing the more kinetic side of intelligence throughout the Cold 
War and after. Domestic agencies have received less coverage, although the 
counter-intelligence efforts of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover have been well 
documented.51 Outside of liberal democracies, agencies such as the Soviet KGB 
and GDR’s Stasi combined foreign and domestic intelligence duties which were 
best described in the context of their respective ‘counterintelligence’ states.52 
                                                          
45
  For example, in Herman Intelligence Power, chs. 16-18. 
46
  Davies, MI6. 
47
  Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11, Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 2007. 
48
  Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, 
London, Frank Cass, 1994, pp. 48-55. 
49
  Intelligence in an Insecure World, chapter 2. 
50
  Just a few examples: John Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence 
from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008; 
Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 3rd edn., New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2003; Kaeten Mistry (ed.), ‘The CIA and U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1947: Reforms, 
Reflections and Reappraisals’, special issue of Intelligence and National Security, 26, 2-3 (2011); 
L. Britt Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008); Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The 
History of the CIA, London, Allen Lane, 2007. 
51
  Frank J. Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political 
Intelligence System, New York, Vintage Books, 1981; William W. Keller, The Liberals and J. 
Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State, Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press, 1989. 
52
  For the KGB, see Andrew & Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive. There is now a 
considerable literature on the Stasi. Key works in English include: Gary Bruce, The Firm: The 
PETER GILL, MARK PHYTHIAN 12 
Apart from largely descriptive histories of agencies and occasional 
attempts to explain how they function in terms of organisational processes that 
we referred to above, another goal of this project is the normative one of 
improving agency performance in terms of effectiveness and, hopefully, 
propriety. The balance between these goals is likely to be determined by the 
context in which it takes place. Where agencies are deemed to have failed, such 
as in the US in not preventing the 9/11 attacks, there has been great 
concentration on the inability of both FBI and CIA to cooperate. These efforts 
are likely to concentrate on recruitment and training – more people with 
language skills and cultural understanding of ‘the other’ must be recruited – and 
seeking organisational and/or technical solutions to problems of information 
sharing. Within the broader context of ‘democratizing’ agencies in former 
authoritarian regimes, emphasis has been placed on increasing the 
professionalism of intelligence officials. This involves replacing loyalty to a 
party or ideology with that to a notion of national security and public safety that 
reflects a genuine assessment of a country’s needs rather than merely the 
security in office of a specific faction. Though the existence or not of such 
professionalism is a factor that normally distinguishes intelligence agencies in 
democratic from those in authoritarian regimes, agencies in some ‘older’ as well 
as ‘newer’ democracies have had to reassess the ethical component of 
professionalism in the wake of the extraordinary rendition scandal. 53  
Compared with other state bureaucracies, intelligence agencies have 
segregated themselves behind walls of secrecy so, if their own methods of 
working were to change, it would be because of their own internal dynamics. 
However, few organisations change themselves easily and, if reform or 
regression takes place, it is very likely to be the result of external pressure from 
other, government or civil society, actors. This relationship is the subject of the 
fourth project: governance/policy. This might be summarised as: what impact 
does intelligence have on government and what impact does government have 
on intelligence? The first of these – the relationship between intelligence and 
policy – is part of the intelligence process referred to above. While much 
intelligence that is developed may go no further than the organisational ‘store of 
                                                                                                                                              
Inside Story of the Stasi, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010; Kristie Macrakis, Seduced by 
Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008; Mike 
Dennis, The Stasi: Myth and Reality, Harlow, Longman, 2003; and Anna Funder, Stasiland: 
Stories From Behind the Berlin Wall, London, Granta, 2003. 
53
  For example, Toni Erskine, “As Rays of Light to the Human Soul? ’Moral Agents and 
Intelligence Gathering’, Intelligence and National Security, 19, 2 (2004), pp. 359-81; Jan 
Goldman (ed.), Ethics of Spying: a Reader for the Intelligence Professional, Lanham, MD, The 
Scarecrow Press, 2006; Michael Herman, ‘Ethics and intelligence after September 2001’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 19, 2 (2004), pp. 342-58; David Omand, Securing the State 
(London, Hurst, 2010); Michael Quinlan, ‘Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an Ethical Theory’, 
Intelligence and National Security 22, 1 (2007), pp. 1-13. 
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memory’, the reason that states fund intelligence at all is so that they are better 
informed. Therefore, one central aspect of the literature, especially in the US, is 
the extent to which intelligence does or does not actually affect government 
policy. In the wake of the Iraq WMD controversy, of course, there has been 
much study of the reverse: when policy determines what is defined as 
‘intelligence’. For most of the twentieth century the answer to the second 
question of how much control and oversight of intelligence agencies was 
exercised by elected governments was: ‘Not a lot’. But in the last quarter 
century or so, a great deal more attention has been given to these questions, both 
in the older democracies where scandals about the abuse of intelligence have led 
to reforms and in post-authoritarian states where more democratic intelligence 
architectures have been constructed.54  
Most of this governance literature to date, following on the historical 
research into single countries and single agencies, is concerned with issues of 
control and oversight of state intelligence only. Current developments throw up 
new challenges for future research, however. First is the rapid growth of 
corporate intelligence represented mainly by the increased role of private 
security and military companies working on contract for governments or 
companies.55 While much of this work is clearly related to security as 
conventionally defined, much of it will also be in the area of ‘economic 
intelligence’ that has received less attention in the Anglo-American literature 
than it does in the more recent European literature, as we saw above in France 
and Spain. A second key area is international intelligence collaboration. The 
earliest work here discussed the post war UKUSA signals intelligence 
agreement between the US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand56 but there 
is little literature on this question, mainly because it is one that all countries and 
agencies keep very secret. New urgency has been injected into the subject by 
the post-9/11 surge in collaboration, mainly at the behest of the US, vis-á-vis 
the perceived global threat of terrorism and the subsequent controversies around 
rendition and torture. Current arrangements for the control and oversight of 
international intelligence cooperation are, to put it mildly, underdeveloped.57 
                                                          
54
  For example, Hans Born, Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards 
and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (Oslo, Parliament of Norway, 2005); 
Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, Ian Leigh (eds.), Who’s Watching the Spies? Establishing 
Intelligence Service Accountability, Washington DC, Potomac Books, 2005; Thomas C. Bruneau, 
Steven Boraz (eds.), Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, 
Austin, University of Texas Press, 2007. 
55
  On intelligence see especially Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire: the Secret World of 
Intelligence Outsourcing, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008. 
56
  Jeffrey T. Richelson, Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind 2nd edn., Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1990. 
57
  Hans Born, Ian Leigh & Aidan Wills (eds.), International Intelligence Cooperation and 
Accountability, London, Routledge, 2011. 
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Finally, we come to the question of at whom IS is aimed. Within UK 
universities there are some courses in intelligence for undergraduates that usually 
reflect the interests of a specific member of staff and sit within broader programmes 
on international relations and politics. The main increase in security-related 
courses since 9/11 has been in ‘terrorism’, e.g. within law, criminology, IR, 
some of which may well include aspects of intelligence. Paul Maddrell’s 2003 survey 
of Intelligence Studies at UK universities identified 12 universities with an 
undergraduate module in some aspect of intelligence studied by about 1000 students.58 
We should note that different academic courses have different emphases: on the 
one hand, there are those seeking to advance the social science analysis of 
security intelligence as a social and political phenomenon;on the other hand, 
there are courses with a higher training component aimed at those already 
working in intelligence or hoping for such a career. 
The oldest example of the latter, and most extensive programme for 
undergraduates, is found in the US at the private university at Mercyhurst, 
where courses were developed specifically for those looking for a career in 
intelligence. In 1995 a non-profit Centre for Intelligence Research and Training 
was created to go after contracts, collaboration and grants in part to give 
students experience of working with open sources through internships with 
companies such as Kroll. After 9/11 both the availability of jobs in the public 
and private sector and those willing to take them increased dramatically: the US 
Intelligence Community initiated a ‘Center of Academic Excellence’ 
programme in 2005 that involves ten US universities.59 These also mainly 
private – there is more resistance on the campuses of public universities to 
teaching intelligence.  
Outside of the US, most courses are at postgraduate level. In several 
European countries there is an explicit attempt to construct an ‘intelligence 
culture’ which reflects post-reform openness and seeks to develop not just 
increased awareness of the importance of a ‘democratic intelligence’ but also 
greater readiness by academics and other professionals to lend their expertise to 
the intelligence community.60 Rey Juan Carlos III University in Madrid established 
a National Intelligence Centre and in 2005 a Chair of Intelligence Services and 
Democratic Systems. In 2006 an Institute of Intelligence for Security and 
Defence was set up at Carlos III University in Madrid. These initiatives are 
sponsored as part of a broader ‘intelligence culture’ project by the Spanish 
intelligence service: Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI). 2009-10 saw the 
first cohort of thirty graduates on the MA in Intelligence Analysis taught by the 
two universities. The journal Inteligencia y seguridad: Revista de análisis y 
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prospectiva, first appeared in 2006. The ‘intelligence culture’ project in Romania 
has been developed similarly by political scientists at the University of Bucharest in 
cooperation with the National Intelligence Academy. Working through an NGO 
initiative – KROSS – which encourages OSINT research, two Academic Intelligence 
and Security Studies (AISS) Conferences have been held in Bucharest.  
There are still only six UK universities with specific postgraduate courses 
in intelligence and something like 120-150 students: Aberystwyth, Birmingham, 
Brunel, Buckingham, King’s College London, Salford. The most recent 
additions to this list – Brunel and Buckingham - market themselves more 
explicitly towards existing practitioners or those who are aiming for a career in 
intelligence, while Salford deploys distance learning for part time students 
already employed in military intelligence. Part of the programme at King’s has 
been developed in response to the Butler Report’s recommendations for reform 
of analyst training.61  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This brief survey indicates that IS represents a healthy and growing 
activity of great relevance to contemporary security governance. At the same 
time IS faces continuing challenges. First, Anglo-American authors and subject 
matter continue to dominate the Anglophone literature. Take, for example, the 
eight volumes published by Praeger (Strategic Intelligence, 5 volumes, 2007), 
Routledge (Handbook of Intelligence Studies, 2007; Intelligence (Critical 
Concepts in Military, Strategic and Security Studies), 2010) and Oxford 
University Press (The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 
2010), all edited by Loch Johnson, which collectively can be regarded as the 
best guide to the ‘state of the art’. Some authors appear in more than one of 
these but there are over 219 authors of the 205 articles. 75% of the authors are 
US-based (94% of the authors are US, UK or Canadian) and roughly 68% of the 
articles concern US intelligence alone. Even allowing for recent history and the 
size of their respective intelligence and university sectors, we suggest we are 
moving too slowly away from the Anglo-American centrism that characterised 
the early development of IS. As we have seen, there are increasing communities 
of scholars elsewhere and it is important that their work be recognised within 
the IS mainstream. Single country studies still constitute the bulk of historical 
and current work; they provide the bedrock for IS, but we suggest a globalised 
world and increased intelligence cooperation cry out for more comparative work 
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so that we can avoid simplistic assumptions about the relevance of the US or UK 
experience to countries with very different economic, political and social conditions.62  
Relations between intelligence agencies and academic institutions have 
not always been easy; indeed, relations between operations people and analysts 
within agencies have often been fraught. Discussing the CIA in its earliest days, 
Roger Hilsman noted: ‘And they (practitioners) distrust the research man-they 
see the researcher as a long- haired academic, poring over musty books in dusty 
libraries far from the realities of practical life.’63 And it does not seem that much 
changed in the following half century: in her analysis of the CIA’s contribution 
to the 9/11 failure, Amy Zegart found that Directorate of Operations (DO) 
officers still viewed analysts with disdain.  
 
‘So deep was the divide between DO officers and analysts that when the 
Counterterrorist Center was first created (in 1996), DO personnel assigned there 
requested additional safes and procedures to keep their information out of the hands of 
the analysts working alongside them, despite the fact that the Center was designed to 
foster precisely this kind of collaboration between analysts and collectors and everyone 
held the same level of security clearance.’64 
 
So it is hardly surprising that there is even greater mistrust from the 
practitioner community towards (even short-haired) academics and, as Scott 
notes, in many countries there is minimal contact and what does occur is fraught 
with suspicion.65 This has a clear impact on the numbers of academics prepared 
to contemplate research into intelligence:66 there is now much archival material 
for historians to examine but accessing more current material is still impossible 
(unless revealed by an agency’s own web-site, inquiry or whistleblowers). 
Many officials will not want to be interviewed and obtaining large research 
grants is much harder than in more conventional areas of ‘political science’. 
However, the study of intelligence remains a fascinating intellectual experience 
                                                          
62
  With colleagues we have tried to set an example, for example, Stuart Farson, Peter GILL, 
Mark Phythian, Shlomo Shpiro (eds.), PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, 
National Approaches: volume one, The Americas and Asia; volume two, Europe, the Middle East 
and South Africa; Farson & Phythian (eds.) Commissions of Inquiry and National Security, 
Westport, CT, Praeger Security International, 2008. See also, Peter Gill, “Knowing the Self, 
Knowing the Other’: the Comparative Analysis of Security Intelligence,’ in Johnson (ed.) 
Handbook of Intelligence Studies, pp.82-90. 
63
  Roger Hilsman ‘Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs’, World Politics, 5, 1 
(1952), pp. 1-45. 
64
  Zegart, Spying Blind, p. 91 
65
  Scott, ‘Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence’, p. 195. 
66
  For example, Amy B. Zegart, ‘Cloaks, Daggers, and Ivory Towers: Why Academics Don’t 
Study U.S. Intelligence’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) Strategic Intelligence, volume 1, 
Understanding the Hidden Side of Government, (Westport, CT, Praeger Security International, 
2007), pp. 21-34. 
INTELLIGENCE STUDIES: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE STATE OF THE ART 17 
with very important potential for the quality of security governance and the 
new, though still partial, openness provides many research opportunities.  
In addition to research, there is also clearly a place for academics to use 
their expertise to advise agencies, but this poses a dilemma for scholars that is 
analogous to that of the correct distance between intelligence professionals and 
policy-makers: if it is too distant then the former have little or no influence; if it 
is too close then their independence may be compromised. Scholars must 
consider the implications of their work: in some circumstances it may not be 
appropriate – for example, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) 
examined concerns over the involvement of anthropologists in the U.S. Army’s 
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq. The AAA concluded 
that the programme’s goals – research, data collection, sources of intelligence 
and a counterinsurgency tactic – were potentially irreconcilable and incompatible 
with disciplinary ethics and practice.67 Practitioners turned academics are in a 
unique position to develop interesting and relevant courses, but academic rigour 
must not be sacrificed to the desire to attract paying students. IS will lose 
legitimacy if it is seen merely as a vehicle for agencies to recreate themselves, 
or for former practitioners to recount ‘war stories’. Thus academics should 
never see themselves as any more than ‘critical friends’ of the agencies. 
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